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Abstract
Matthew W. Mosconi
Social Cognitive Development During the Latency Years: 
An examination of three measures
 (Under the direction of Gary Mesibov, Ph.D.)
A host of research has focused on social cognitive development.  Still, measurement 
limitations have hindered progress.  Limitations include failures to examine developments in 
latency aged children and a scarcity of data examining related cognitive skills.  We 
administered three social cognition measures, the Faux Pas Task (FP), the Movie Stills task 
(MS), and the Animations task, to 64 children between 6-12 years, and assessed children’s 
verbal ability.  Results indicated that chronological age was related to MS and Animations 
task performance, but not to FP task performance after covarying children’s verbal ability.  
FP task performance was related to verbal mental age.  Individual items of the FP task were 
separated in difficulty by whether or not they contained a negative word or phrase.  Items 
with a negative word or phrase were answered correctly more often.   These results and their 
implications for future research on social cognitive development are discussed.  
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1Background and Significance
A great deal of research has explored social cognition (i.e., the ability to interpret 
social information).  This research has highlighted the importance of studying social 
cognitive development for understanding changes in social behavior and developments in 
language and other cognitive abilities.  Additionally, research has highlighted a connection 
between social cognitive deficits and several psychiatric disorders, such as autism (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, 1995) and conduct disorder (Dodge & Pettit, 2003).  In spite of the importance 
of these processes to cognitive and behavioral development, the measurement of social 
cognition has been studied infrequently.  As a result, measurement limitations have hindered 
progress in the investigation of social cognitive development and, also, have drawn criticism 
from numerous researchers (e.g., Ozonoff, personal communication).  Consequently, the goal 
of the present investigation was to examine three central social cognition tasks to determine 
their sensitivity to important social cognitive developments that occur in latency-aged 
typically developing children.  
Social Cognitive Development
Social cognition refers to the ability to organize and interpret social information in 
order to understand and predict the behavior of others.  It is characterized by a variety of 
skills, including the ability to infer the mental states of others, understand communicative 
gestures (e.g. nonverbal gestures), detect others’ intentions, and recognize and regulate 
emotions (for a review, see Flavell, 1999).  This paper will examine tasks measuring several 
of these functions, including theory of mind processing and emotion recognition.
2Numerous investigations have explored the development of social cognitive skills.  
For example, researchers have shown that early in ontogeny, infants evidence a number of 
social cognitive precursors, including a preference for social stimuli relative to objects 
(Morton & Johnson, 1991), increased attention to faces relative to other stimuli (IBID), and 
the ability to discriminate different emotions (Bornstein & Arterberry, 2003).  During the 
toddler and preschool years, children begin to display new social cognitive skills, including 
joint attention and theory of mind processing (i.e., the ability to infer the mental state of 
others).  Then, throughout the latency years, they show even more complex social cognitive 
aptitudes, including the ability to integrate multiple pieces of information from intricate 
social interactions, decipher the intentions underlying social behavior, and recognize
emotions from a broad set of dynamic and static cues.  The present investigation will focus 
on measuring several of the social cognitive skills that develop during the latency years, 
including theory of mind processing and emotion recognition.
Advanced Theory of Mind Functions
Theory of mind processing refers to the ability to infer the mental states of others, 
including their thoughts, desires, beliefs, and intentions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). In young 
children, the emergence of a theory of mind is often triggered by the realization that others 
may have separate beliefs or a different perspective than their own.  A lack of theory of mind 
is often demonstrated by young children (i.e., younger than age 4 years) who may wave 
good-bye with their hands facing themselves, replicating the perspective that they have when 
others are waving to them.  Subsequent, or advanced theory of mind developments include 
understanding the intentions underlying behavior, and the comprehension that information 
not only is perceived, but also interpreted by others.  For instance, Wellman and Hickling 
3(1994) suggested that four to five year old children only begin to understand that mental 
contents are actively constructed by the person and “are subject to biases, misrepresentations, 
and active interpretation” (p. 1578).  
Research on advanced theory of mind functioning has been limited.  Carpendale and 
Chandler (1996) suggest that advanced theory of mind processing largely has been ignored 
by researchers because of the mistaken assumption that children’s ability to identify that 
others have separate mental states is reflective of an understanding that people may interpret 
the same stimulus in different ways.  This “interpretive” component of a theory of mind 
allows for children to appreciate the fact that one stimulus event can support two or more 
distinct interpretations.  Latency-aged children improve in their ability to understand 
ambiguous behavior or events. Throughout development, children also become better able to 
understand more complex social environments.  Complexity has been defined in terms of the 
number of variables that are related in a cognitive representation (Halford, Wilson, & 
Phillips, 1998) and has been shown to modulate the age at which children are able to pass 
theory of mind tasks (Andrews, Halford, Bunch, Bowden, & Jones, 2003).  
Theory of mind development also is related to advancements in other cognitive 
domains.  Research has indicated that success on theory of mind tasks may be mediated by 
general cognitive improvements.  For instance, several studies have indicated that 
performance IQ is highly correlated with processing complex visual scenes (De Sonneville, 
et al., 2002) while verbal IQ (VIQ) may be predictive of performance on many verbally 
administered theory of mind tasks (Happe, 1994).  As a result, developments in theory of 
mind often have been difficult to isolate.  Thus, studies of advanced theory of mind 
development must adequately examine the development of the interpretive character of 
4knowledge, the role of the complexity of information that has to be integrated in theory of 
mind tasks, and the influence of general cognitive development on performance.
Emotion Recognition Functions
In addition to theory of mind processing, several other social cognitive functions 
continue to develop throughout childhood.  Amongst these functions is the ability to 
recognize others’ emotions.  Individuals use a variety of cues to infer emotions, including 
voice intonations, context, facial cues and nonverbal gestures.  Emotion recognition skills 
appear to develop parallel to traditional theory of mind abilities (Buitelaar & van der Wees, 
1997; Joseph, 1992) and are critical to later social aptitude (Iannotti, 1985) and prosocial 
behavior, such as empathy (Strayer, 1980).
Studies examining the development of emotion recognition in typically developing 
children have suggested that the processing of facial cues and other nonverbal emotional 
expressions undergoes major developments between 3-12 years- old (Harrigan, 1984; 
Phillipot & Feldman, 1990).  Several investigations have examined children’s ability to 
correctly identify the emotions of characters in a story and have indicated that children 
improve in their ability to recognize emotions from facial and other nonverbal cues during 
latency years, and that females demonstrate superior performance relative to age-matched 
males (Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997; Odom & Lemond, 1972; Rotenberg & Sullivan, 
2003).  Studying the development of emotion recognition skills during this period of 
childhood is thus important for both understanding important gender differences in social 
development and mapping typical developmental pathways of social processing.
Measuring Social Cognitive Development
5A variety of measurement tools have been developed to assess aspects of social 
cognition. Most studies of theory of mind processing have incorporated false-belief tasks 
that were designed to assess individuals’ ability to understand that people may have separate 
mental states.  The following is a typical example of a false-belief task: 
Sally and Ann are standing next to one another.  Sally has a 
marble in the basket in front of her.  Sally leaves the room and, 
while Sally is out of the room, Ann removes the marble and 
hides it in a different basket.  Children are then asked, “When 
Sally returns, where will she look for the marble?”
By four to five years of age, most children are able to accurately predict that Sally 
will look for the marble where she left it.  This response signifies that children have an 
understanding that other individuals may have separate beliefs or knowledge states than their 
own.  Thus, although the child in the experiment knows where the marble is, the child with a 
theory of mind also knows that ‘Sally’ does not know where the marble is.
Other social cognition measures have focused on children’s interpretive character of 
knowledge (Carpendale and Chandler, 1996; Taylor, Lussier and Maring, 2003), 
understanding of humor (e.g., McGhee, 1979), sense of irony (e.g., Winner & Leekam, 
1991), emotion recognition (Leppanen and Hietanen, 2001), and identification of socially 
awkward moments (Baron-Cohen, O’riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Happe, 1994).  
Studies using these measurement tools each have suggested that children develop important 
social cognitive insights during the latency years.
Limitations of Social Cognitive Measures
6Despite these findings, several critical issues have limited research on social 
cognition measures.  First, many theory of mind measures are “paper-and-pencil tasks” in 
which social scenarios are read by or to participants.  These tasks place reading and verbal 
demands upon children and may be more sensitive to tangential cognitive operations, 
including attention, executive processes, and verbal comprehension.  Researchers have 
suggested that much of the variability in theory of mind performance amongst children may 
be attributed to developments in other cognitive functions, particularly in verbal domains 
(e.g., Liss et al., 2001).  Second, theory of mind tests may not correspond directly to social 
functioning.  Participants are seldom made to formulate on-line inferences as in naturalistic 
social scenarios.  Tasks that provide subjects with static vignettes do not provide the same 
breadth of cues involved in naturalistic interactions.  Indeed, several studies have suggested 
that performance on theory of mind tasks may not always correspond directly with real-life
social functioning (Custrini & Feldman, 1989; Leppanen & Hietanen, 2001).  Third, few 
advanced social cognition tasks have been implemented with large samples of typically 
developing children.  Many reported measures document differences between specific 
populations (e.g., autism, patients with neurological damage) and typically developing 
children.  However, only by examining developmental differences between different age 
groups of children can researchers truly elucidate typical developmental pathways and the 
mechanisms underlying these changes.  Fourth, few measures have been used in multiple 
studies, limiting the generalizability of findings and the ability of researchers to identify 
factors that predict children’s performance (e.g., gender, age, verbal ability).  
Several additional limitations emerge from studies of emotion recognition 
measurement.  First, emotion recognition skills may be different for distinct emotions.  
7Neuroscientific research has suggested that distinct neural networks may be associated with
the processing of positive and negative emotions (Adolphs, 2002), and that these networks 
may develop at different rates (Giedd et al., 2003).  Rarely have studies examined the 
development of emotion recognition for distinct emotions separately.  Second, children 
appear to reach adult levels of recognizing basic facial emotions presented in pictures at an 
early age.  However, studies have indicated that although progress in emotion recognition 
begins to stabilize around the age of 9-12 years in females, males may continue to develop 
until early adolescence (Harrigan, 1984).  Also, these studies may not provide the entire 
picture because children only view isolated pictures without the complexities of a naturalistic 
social event.  New, more naturalistic measures are important for mapping gender specific and 
emotion specific pathways of emotion recognition development.
Present Investigation
The present study sought to investigate three measures of social cognition 
development that differ in their target skills (i.e., advanced theory of mind processing, 
emotion recognition, intentionality detection) and the cues that they provide (i.e., contextual, 
facial and other nonverbal gestures, goal-directed movements).  Two of these measures (Faux 
Pas Task and Animations Task) were chosen because they have been used in recently 
published research, studied multiple times, shown to be sensitive to neuropsychiatric 
impairments, and reported to be reliable and valid.  The Animations task also was chosen 
because it provides subjects with dynamic stimuli for which they need to track ongoing 
interactions.  It was hypothesized that this measure would be the closest approximate of how 
children would view real- life social interaction.  The third task (Movie Stills) was chosen due 
to its reported sensitivity to emotion recognition deficits in a patient population (i.e., patients 
8with amygdala damage), its capacity to separate facial cues from other nonverbal social 
gestures, and the complexity of its stimuli.  Each of these tasks was administered to a sample 
of latency-aged typically developing children to examine the measures’ sensitivity to social 
cognitive developments, ability to measure the skills which they intend to measure, and 
capacity to measure distinct functions.  Additionally, factors associated with developmental 
differences between older and younger children were investigated for each task.  Specific 
goals for each task are discussed below.
Faux Pas (FP) Task
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) developed the Faux Pas Task (FP) as a measure of 
children’s ability to identify social faux pas, or awkward and inappropriate statements that 
are potentially offensive without the intent of inflicting harm or causing embarrassment.  The 
FP consists of ten short stories in which two or more characters interact, and one of these 
characters “says something that they should not have said.”  An example of a FP item is as 
follows:
Kim helped her mom make an apple pie for her uncle when he came to 
visit.  She carried it out of the kitchen.  “I made it just for you,” said 
Kim.  “Mmm,” replied Uncle Tom, “That looks lovely.  I love pies, 
except for apple, of course!”
In order to identify such a social blunder, children must comprehend the context 
surrounding the event, while also recognizing the separate mental states of each character 
both before and after the target statement.  Children also are asked one question regarding the 
intent of the character committing the faux pas for which they must recognize that the 
speaker did not maliciously commit the identified inappropriate statement.  Therefore, 
9children’s ability to correctly respond to FP items requires an integration of multiple 
variables, understanding of each character’s knowledge state, perception of the emotional 
impact of the target statement, and a comprehension of the intent of the speaker.  
Originally, the authors administered the FP to sixty children between 7 and 11 years 
old and indicated that older children correctly identified more faux pas items than younger 
children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).  The authors also reported that typically developing 
children outperformed IQ-matched children with autism.  These findings suggested that the 
FP was sensitive to theory of mind developments appearing during latency years, as well as 
theory of mind deficits characteristic of children with autism.  This measure has since been 
used in several studies and been shown to be sensitive to theory of mind impairments in 
patients with bilateral amygdala damage (Stone et al., 2003), frontotemporal dementia or 
Alzheimer’s disease (Gregory et al., 2002), and nonverbal learning disorder (Dorfman, 
2001).  Still, only one of these studies (i.e., Dorfman, 2001) investigated the FP test in 
children, and this study compared only 19 children to a group of severely impaired learning 
disabled children. 
Amongst these studies, several limitations emerge.  First, none of the authors 
adequately investigated the verbal intelligence of their subjects.  The original test developers 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) reported that verbal mental age (VMA) was significantly 
correlated with children’s performance on the task (r=.52, p>.05), though they do not account 
for this relationship when examining differences between age groups.  Thus, it is possible 
that improved performance on the FP could be moderated by improvements in understanding 
more subtle aspects of the stories or acquired skills in articulating final responses.  The 
authors counter this potential criticism by arguing that children responded to a general 
10
comprehension question for each story, and that children in the study had to pass a minimum 
of 7 out of 10 comprehension questions to be included.  However, these comprehension 
questions were somewhat basic, and the authors did not specify how many children failed to
correctly answer a sufficient number.  The comprehension questions do not account for more 
subtle verbal nuances and thus may not address more complex verbal and comprehension 
demands.  
A second limitation of these studies is that they do not tease apart the components of 
theory of mind processing that are developing amongst typical children.  The original authors 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) do not postulate why children who were able to accurately 
identify one faux pas were not able to identify the remaining items.  They indicate that no 
items proved to be significantly more or less difficult than others.  But, the authors do not 
offer an explanation as to why children who were able to score above chance on the test were 
not able to correctly respond to all of the items, despite clearly having acquired some 
capacity to detect inappropriate statements.  Two different mechanisms may account for this 
perplexing finding.  First, older children may not have a more developed theory of mind per 
se, but they may be more skillful and consistent in applying this skill to novel circumstances.  
Such discrepancies have been reported in previous research on language and memory 
abilities and suggest that children may be competent in a cognitive domain before they are 
able to consistently apply this competence (Ornstein, Naus & Liberty, 1975).  Second, there 
may be an underlying difference between some of the items or groups of items that allows 
the targeted statements to be more or less identifiable.  Stories differ on several dimensions, 
including length, placement of the target statement, character responses to the target 
statement, and identifying words within the faux pas that make the statement more overt (e.g. 
11
“horrible” or “weird”).  Therefore, it is possible that the authors’ measure may be tapping 
developmental changes in theory of mind skill with items that may be differentiated by 
factors unrelated to children’s ability to infer the intentions and mental contents of others.  
These questions each were examined in the present study.
Movie Stills Task (MS)
The Movie Stills Task (MS), developed by Adolphs and Tranel (2003), measures 
individuals’ ability to recognize emotions in complex scenes.  This measure includes two 
series of pictures, each depicting complex social scenes.  The two conditions are 
distinguished from one another only by the presence or absence of faces.  Subjects are asked 
to label the emotion that most closely matches the way that the character in the center of the 
photo is feeling.  By utilizing two sets of pictures, the authors were able to tease out the level 
of improvement gained from being able to use facial information to recognize emotions.  
Adolphs and Tranel (2003) previously reported that subjects with neurological 
damage to the amygdala, a neural structure associated with processing facial emotions (for a 
review, see Adolphs & Tranel, 2000), performed significantly worse at identifying emotions 
from scenes with faces than neurotypical subjects and subjects with non-amygdalar 
neurological damage.  In contrast, patients with amygdala damage did not show impairments 
in their ability to recognize emotions from scenes with faces erased.  These findings suggest 
that the MS task is sensitive to facial emotion recognition deficits.  
This measure may be particularly useful for mapping the development of emotion 
recognition from facial cues within complex, naturalistic social scenes.  Most studies 
examining facial emotion recognition development control for social cues outside of the face 
by excluding them.  This measure offers a novel method of disentangling facial cues from 
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other social gestures and presents subjects with scenes that more closely resemble real-life 
social events.  However, no prior studies have applied this task to children.  By administering 
this task to children, we may better understand the development of children’s ability to 
recognize different emotion cues and different emotion types.
Animations Task
Abell, Happe and Frith (2000) first developed the Animations task, based on the work 
of Heider and Simmel (1944), in order to measure children’s ability to accurately infer 
mental states and the intentions underlying behavior.  This task depicts geometric shapes 
moving in a goal-directed manner as if they were interacting.  Heider and Simmel’s original 
study indicated that most neurotypical adults naturally ascribe agency and intentionality to 
these shapes.  Studies using versions of this task have demonstrated that non-human primates 
(Uller & Nicholls, 2000), infants (Gergeley et al., 1995 in Klin), children (Abell, Happe, & 
Frith, 2000; Bowler & Thomen, 2000; Springer, Meier, & Berry, 1996) and adults (for an 
extensive review, see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) spontaneously attribute “mentalizing” 
behaviors, social intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and emotions, to the shapes.  This measure 
thus serves as a wonderful resource for investigating theory of mind inferences, emotion 
recognition, and social processing amongst different populations.
This newer version of the moving shapes task was made more child-friendly, with the 
shapes being drawn in different colors and the scenes depicting more child-like themes (e.g., 
playing, follow-the-leader).  Unlike the other two tasks in this study, the Animations task 
provides children with a dynamic scene in which characters interact.  This task is more 
naturalistic than most social cognition measures in that the shapes are moving throughout.  
13
Results from this task and similar tasks have indicated that the performance of older 
children is superior to younger children.  For example, Springer, Meier and Berry (1996) 
indicated that 5-year-old-children’s characterization of geometric shapes moving in a goal-
directed manner were more similar than those offered by 3- and 4-year-old children to adult 
descriptions. Additionally, Abell, Happe, and Frith (2000) demonstrated that 8 year-old 
typically developing children outperformed mental-age matched children with autism.  
However, both studies failed to account for children’s verbal ability.  It is not clear whether 
superior performance was predicted by children’s vocabulary level, ability to describe 
mentalizing terms, or social cognitive skill.  Conclusions from the Springer, Meier, and Berry 
(1996) study also were limited by their failure to discuss whether the children became more 
descriptive, more accurate, or both in their narratives.  Children’s improved ability to 
describe the behaviors depicted by the geometric figures may be a result of their developing 
verbal abilities and increased vocabulary, improved intentionality detection, or greater skill 
in recognizing emotions.  These components have not yet been teased apart.
The sensitivity of this test to the developing social abilities of typically developing 
children has not been examined.  Abell, Happe, and Frith (2000) investigated a small sample 
of 8 year-olds, allowing the authors to report that children make social attributions from 
shapes but limiting their ability to draw conclusions about the development of this inference-
making skill.  In a similar study, Bowler and Thommen (2000) utilized a geometric figures 
task but focused only on the performance of a single age-group and did not investigate 
complex mental state attributions (e.g., bluffing, deception).  Developmental studies are 
necessary for providing a baseline against which to compare atypical development and for 
14
supplying information regarding the utility and specificity of tasks of moving geometric 
shapes.  
Summary 
Research has shown that children exhibit critical theory of mind and emotion 
recognition developments throughout the latency years.  However, less is known about the 
mechanisms by which children improve in their theory of mind processing.  Limitations in 
the research on social cognition measures have hindered progress in this field.  Many 
advanced social cognition measures have been implemented with psychiatric or neurological 
patients but have not been administered to large samples of typically developing children.  
Also, when they have been used, researchers have seldom examined individual items of these 
measures in order to tease out specific variables integral to children’s social cognitive 
development.  Finally, children’s performance has not always been examined in relation to 
changes in other cognitive domains.  The present study sought to address each of these 
limitations with three social cognition tasks.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1.  Based on previous research indicating that the development of theory 
of mind processing is highly related to emotion recognition development in typical children 
(Buitelaar & van der Wees, 2003), we predicted that children’s performance on each of the 
three studied social cognition measures would be correlated with one another.
Hypothesis 2.  This hypothesis focused on children’s performance on the FP task, and 
contains two related predictions.  First, previous studies have indicated that older children 
performed significantly better than younger children on the FP task (Baron-Cohen, et al., 
1999).  We thus predicted that chronological age would serve as a significant predictor of 
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performance.  Second, studies have indicated that children’s performance on theory of mind 
tasks in which children must comprehend verbal material is modulated by their verbal ability
(Happe, 1994).  We thus predicted that children’s performance would also be significantly 
predicted by their verbal mental age.
Hypothesis 3. Based on research investigating emotion recognition development, we 
hypothesized that chronological age would be a significant predictor of children’s 
performance on the MS task.  Also, we hypothesized that children would show superior 
performance on scenes with faces, than scenes without faces.  We also hypothesized that, 
because this task did not place large demands on children’s verbal comprehension, that 
chronological age would be a significant predictor after covarying the effects of verbal 
mental age.
Hypothesis 4. We hypothesized that older children would describe social scenes by 
using more mental state references, and also would be more accurate in their descriptions 
than younger children.  We believed that these differences would be evident for complex 
social scenes in which the shapes moved as if to affect each others’ mental states, but not for 
scenes with random movements.  Also, because this task was not dependent on children’s 
ability to understand verbal information, we thought that chronological age would be a 
significant predictor above and beyond the predictive value of verbal mental age.
Hypotheis 5. Hypothesis 5 was largely exploratory.  We sought to investigate 
whether any of the FP items were more or less difficult than other items.  We also wanted to 
investigate whether length of vignettes, in which portion of the vignette the faux pas 
occurred, how many characters were present, or whether the faux pas contained a negative 
connotation or overtly inappropriate statement was related to the difficulty of items.  
16
Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis was largely exploratory as we sought to investigate 
differential patterns of performance between emotion types on scenes with and scenes 
without faces.  
17
Method
Participants
Sixty-four children between 6-12 years old (37 male, mean age=112 months, age 
range=73-148 months) were recruited through three local recreational camps.  Three social 
cognition tasks and one receptive vocabulary test were administered to each child.  With the 
exception of the receptive vocabulary test, the order of tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. The vocabulary task always was administered first in case children 
demonstrated significant verbal impairments that either would confound results or prevent 
the child from fully comprehending the tasks.  This did not occur during the course of the 
study.
Measures and Procedure
Verbal ability
Verbal ability was measured with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised 
(PPVT-R; Dunn & Dunn, 1981).  During this test, children must choose from a series of four 
pictures the option that most closely matches the word given by the examiner.  For example, 
the examiner would read “Point to cat.”  This test has been normalized on age-referenced 
groups among a large sample of healthy children and adults between ages 2.5 and 90 years
old.  Based upon these samples, children’s raw scores, or the total number of correct items, 
may be converted into standardized scores with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, 
percentile ranks, stanines, and age equivalents.  Because verbal mental age (VMA) offered an
18
indication of children’s current verbal functioning independent from their chronological age, 
these values were used for all analyses.  
This test was selected for the present study for several reasons.  First, unlike many 
expressive verbal tasks, the PPVT-R does not measure children’s knowledge of factual 
information or social rules.  The PPVT-R is a more direct measure of children’s knowledge 
of words.  Second, the PPVT-R is less susceptible to underestimates resulting from children 
becoming anxious or bored during testing.  Unlike tasks that require children to verbalize
responses, the PPVT-R’s only demand is that children point to the appropriate item. The 
PPVT-R does not require children to explain answers and can be easily administered to 
younger and more hesitant children (Dunn & Dunn, 1997).   Third, the current project 
included three measures of social cognitive processing, each potentially lasting up to 30 
minutes.  The PPVT-R is more quickly administered than other verbal tasks, decreasing the 
likelihood that children would become fatigued.  Fourth, this test has been shown to be 
highly predictive of verbal and overall IQ (Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  Finally, previous reports 
have shown that children’s performance on picture vocabulary tasks is highly correlated with 
their performance on social cognition tasks (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O’riordan, Stone, Jones, & 
Plaisted, 1999; Happe, 1994).  Therefore, by incorporating the PPVT-R into final covariate 
analyses, we were more likely to be measuring that component of verbal ability that may 
confound interpretations of social cognition testing.
Psychometric Properties.  Studies have indicated that the PPVT-R demonstrates good 
psychometric properties (Dunn & Dunn, 1981).  The test’s authors computed alpha 
coefficients to measure internal consistency.  Coefficients ranged from .93-.98 across age 
groups (median=.95).  Split-half reliability coefficients derived from comparing odd- and 
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even-numbered items also were high (range = .86-.97; median = .94).  Test-retest reliability 
analyses indicated that children’s performance during an initial administration and then one 
month later was consistent (median alpha=.92).  
The PPVT- R also appears to be a valid measure and is highly correlated with other 
vocabulary test and subtests, as well as IQ tests (for a review, see Williams & Wang, 1997).  
Correlations with vocabulary and IQ tests for the age groups in the present study ranged from 
.59 to .76.  Also, items were selected from a pool of words on the basis of normative data of a 
large sample of healthy individuals.  Items only were included if their growth curves were 
congruous with other items on the test, and percentage passing rates for each group indicated 
that a slightly higher percentage of children for successive age group correctly identified the 
item (Dunn & Dunn, 1981).
Social Cognition Measures
Faux Pas Task (FP).  The Faux Pas task (FP) is a fifteen-item measure in which 
subjects read vignettes of 2-3 sentences, 10 of which contain a social faux pas (Baron-Cohen, 
O’riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999).  The remaining five items were matched on 
length and complexity and were comparable to the faux pas items in every way except that 
they did not contain a faux pas.  These items served as control stories to increase the 
likelihood that children would not be able to answer questions correctly by assuming that a 
faux pas was committed.  Subjects then were asked four separate questions regarding 1) 
whether or not a faux pas had been committed, 2) if yes, what the faux pas was, 3) a 
comprehension question specific to each item, and 4) a false-belief question regarding 
whether or not the speaker knew that their statement would be offensive or embarrassing.  
The first two questions probed whether or not children detected a faux pas.  The third 
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question assessed children’s ability to attend to and understand the story.  The final question 
was asked to assess whether children understood that the faux pas was a result of an absence 
of knowledge or memory, rather than malicious intent.  Order of items was counterbalanced 
across subjects to eliminate novelty or fatigue bias, and control items were evenly dispersed 
amongst stories containing a faux pas.
Items in which children neither identified the faux pas nor correctly answered the 
comprehension question were not included in final analyses.  Items were scored correct only 
if each question was answered correctly.  However, additional analyses were performed in 
which a total score (0-2) for faux pas questions was given for each item (not counting a point 
for comprehension questions and grouping the first two questions into one item).  This 
method provided information regarding whether children were able to correctly identify the 
faux pas as well as perceive the intention underlying the statement.
Movie Stills (MS).  The MS task consists of sixteen black and white pictures from 
commercial films with faces erased as well as a series of the same pictures with faces 
included (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003).  This task has been reported to be a measure of emotion 
recognition from facial and nonfacial cues that is sensitive to specific neurological damage 
(IBID).  Stimuli were selected by the test authors based upon the reliability of responses from 
healthy adults in a pilot study.  All stimuli show complex scenes with at least one person 
displaying a range of simple and complex emotions.  The stimuli varied in terms of the 
particular cues that provided information about the emotion, but each contained multiple cues 
(e.g., body posture, head posture, direction of eye gaze, hand and arm gestures), including 
facial expressions.  
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Subjects are shown each of the 16 photographs with faces erased and asked to match 
the photo to a list of seven words: happy, sad, angry, afraid, disgusted, surprised, or neutral in 
terms of how they thought the people in the picture felt.  Each word was read and explained 
to children in child-friendly language matching as closely as possible the definitions found in 
the Oxford Dictionary, and children then were asked if they understood the meaning of all 
the words.  In the case that they did not, words were re-explained until the child indicated 
that he or she understood.  Following the administration of the first 16 photographs, children 
were then shown each picture with faces included and given the same instructions.
Children had no time limit on this task.  In the case that there were multiple people in 
the photograph, children were shown which character to focus on.  In each case, this was the 
person who was most directly facing the viewer and judged to occupy the primary role in the 
scene.
Performance by children was scored in relation to previously acquired healthy adult 
responses in order to form a continuous score of proficiency.  Thus, if 100% of normal 
subjects called a scene “happy”, then a subject would get a score of 1.0 for choosing the label 
“happy” and 0.0 for all other choices.  However, in the event of more ambiguous stimuli, 
children’s scores ranged between 0.0 and 1.0 based upon the proportion of healthy adults 
who labeled each of the possible emotions for that particular photograph.  For example, if 
50% of subjects labeled a photograph as “surprised,” 40% called it “afraid,” and 10% called 
it “sad,” a subject would receive a 1.0 for choosing “surprised,” .8 for choosing “afraid,” and 
.2 for choosing “sad.”  Thus, correctness was made a parametric function of the distribution 
of responses given by healthy adults.  In this manner, higher scores represent superior 
recognition ability.  In order to identify the degree to which performance improved when 
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faces were presented relative to the faces erased condition, we subtracted scores on the initial 
condition (i.e. faces erased) from scores on the latter condition (i.e. faces included).  
Animations.  Animations were designed previously using a MacroMedia Director 4.0 
program for Power Macintosh (Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2000), and were converted to 
.avi files and presented with QuickTime Player software.  Each vignette consisted of one red 
triangle and one blue triangle moving around the screen, usually with a blue square 
enclosure.  Three conditions of Animations were shown to children:  theory of mind (ToM), 
goal-directed (GD), and random (RD).  The three conditions were matched for length and 
complexity, with all animations lasting between 34 and 45 seconds.  Also, each condition 
showed enclosures and shape changes (e.g., a triangle squeezing through a gap) at an equal 
rate in order to ensure that the differences in interpretation were not due to any configural 
alterations between conditions.  Ten vignettes were shown to each subject, including four 
ToM, three GD and three RD animations.  One GD and one RD animation each were shown 
to children prior to the experiment to familiarize them with the task.  Including these practice 
items resulted in one fewer test item for two conditions (i.e., RD and GD) compared to the 
ToM condition.  
In the RD animations, the triangles did not interact with each other and moved 
without purpose (e.g., floating in space, bouncing off walls).  In the GD sequences, one 
triangle responded to the other triangle and the two demonstrated a simple interaction in 
which their movements were contingent upon one another (e.g., one triangle leading the 
other).  For each of these vignettes, there was reciprocal interaction without any indication 
that either of the triangles was affecting the mental state of the other triangle.  In the ToM 
vignettes, the two triangles interacted in a manner that suggested that one of the triangles was 
23
deliberately trying to read or affect the mental state of the other triangle (e.g., one triangle 
surprising the other, one triangle mocking the other, one triangle persuading the other, one 
triangle tricking the other).  In all three conditions, the triangles moved as if self-propelled.  
In previous studies, children were given cues as to what they were going to see contingent 
upon the condition (Abell, Happe and Frith, 2000).  In contrast, in the present study, in order 
to reduce children’s bias for attributing social meaning to stimuli, children were not primed 
for any condition and were merely instructed to “Watch the cartoon.”  
Following each scene, descriptions were elicited by asking subjects, “What happened 
in that cartoon?”  Feedback was given if necessary (e.g., try to pay attention to the entire 
cartoon) during the practice items, but not during test items.  General encouragement was 
offered during the experiment proper, and all responses were recorded.  Animations were 
presented in a pseudo-random order and counterbalanced across subjects.
Subjects’ responses were scored along three dimensions: intentionality, 
appropriateness, and length (see Appendix A for scoring guidelines).  Intentionality referred 
to the degree of mental state attribution reported in a given narrative and was scored between 
1-5 with 1 representing no intentionality, and 5 being given to those narratives in which 
descriptions referred to action with the deliberate intent of affecting the other character’s 
mental state.  Appropriateness was scored between 0-2 for each narrative with higher scores 
indicating that children had accurately identified all of the intended actions in the scene, and 
lower scores indicating that narratives reflected only a minor and non-central aspect of the 
story or implausible action.  Therefore, appropriateness scores were independent of 
intentionality scores.  For example, children received an intentionality score of “0” for the 
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description “The two triangles were bouncing around.”  This description also would be 
scored as a “2” for appropriateness if it referred to a RD vignette.  
Finally, narratives were scored for length.  In contrast to original scoring guidelines 
(Abell, Happe & Frith, 2000) in which all narratives with more than 3 clauses were coded as 
a 3, the number of clauses was scored in a continuous manner.  This was done in order to 
decrease the likelihood that differences would be obscured by a restricted range.  Clauses 
were defined as a subject and a predicate and did not include clauses that were irrelevant to 
the action of the narrative (e.g. “It looked like” or “and then it ended.”)
Three independent raters performed all scoring for the Animations narratives.  In 
order to calculate both inter-rater and intra-rater reliability, each rater independently scored 5 
cases, each containing ten animations, on two separate occasions.  The Rater Agreement 
Index (RAI; Burry-Stock, Shaw, Laurie, & Chissom, 1996) was used to calculate both inter-
and intra-rater reliability coefficients for Intentionality and Appropriateness.  The RAI 
measures the degree to which coders agree on their ratings in reference to the possible range 
of ratings.  The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement.  The basic 
formula for calculating these values is: RAI = 1 – (|R1-R2| / (I-1)) where R1=coder A’s rating, 
R2=coder B’s rating, I=the range of the scale.  The RAI was selected because, unlike other 
reliability coefficients, it assesses separate raters’ ability to both score similarly to one 
another and remain consistent over time.  Reliability on Length measures was analyzed using 
Pearson correlations because there was no finite range of values for this variable.  
  RAIs for interrater reliability on Intentionality and Appropriateness of responses 
ranged from .88 to .91 and .89 to .90 respectively.  Pearson correlations for length ranged 
from .87 to .92.  Also, RAI’s for intrarater reliability on Intentionality and Appropriateness 
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ranged from .94 to .96 and .91 to .96 respectively, whereas Pearson correlations for length 
ranged from .89 to .94.  Raters demonstrated adequate reliability using the Animations 
scoring procedures; consequently, inferential statistics were performed.
To test the hypotheses, an average of two raters’ scores was used for each response.  
However, when the scores for the two raters differed by more than one for either 
Intentionality or Appropriateness, the third rater scored this item and the average of the two 
scores closest together was used.  These scores were used for all analyses.  In the case of 
Length, when two ratings differed by more than 2, then all three raters discussed the item 
until they could reach a consensus on the number of clauses.
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Results
Relationship Between Measures
In order to examine the relationship between the three social cognition measures, we 
correlated each element of the FP, MS, and Animations tasks (see Table 1).  These analyses 
were performed in order to address whether the measures were sensitive to the same latent 
construct and to determine whether tasks with static cues (i.e., FP task and MS task) 
predicted performance on a task with more naturalistic, dynamic interactions.  
Two-tailed Pearson Product Moment correlations indicated that scores on the FP 
tasks were positively correlated with performance on both conditions of the MS measure 
(with faces condition: r(60)=.302, p=.015; without faces condition r(60)=.285, p=.027).  Faux 
Pas scores also were significantly correlated with appropriateness scores for ToM animations 
r(60)=.332, p=.008, but not with any other Animations outcome scores.  Interestingly, these 
results suggest that performance on the FP is closely related to children’s ability to recognize 
emotions and to appropriately infer the intentions underlying social interactions.  However, 
FP task scores were not as closely associated with children’s increasing tendency to use more 
mental state language in Animations scenes, or to their accuracy for less complex scenes. 
Performance on the MS condition with faces was significantly correlated with 
intentionality scores on all three Animations conditions (RD: r(61)=.380, p=.002; GD: 
r(61)=.290, p=.020; TOM: r(61)=.360, p=.004), suggesting that emotion recognition ability is 
related to the level of intentionality that children attribute to nonverbal, dynamic portrayals of 
social interactions.  But, results suggesting that higher MS scores were predictive of greater
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intentionality attributions in the RD condition indicate that children may overattribute goals 
and social intentions.  Similar results were found when examining the relationship between 
the MS condition without faces and intentionality scores for the three Animations conditions 
(see Table 1).  Thus, these measures appear to be related, suggesting that children’s 
developing ability to recognize emotions in complex scenes, whether conveyed through 
facial expressions or other cues, is highly related to their ability to ascribe intentions to 
interacting stimuli.
When examining the relationship between emotion recognition abilities and 
children’s ability to accurately describe the most complex of the Animations scenes (i.e., 
ToM vignettes), we found that scores in both MS conditions were highly correlated with 
children’s Appropriateness scores (with faces: r(61)=.359, p=.004; without faces: r(61)=.425, 
p=.001; see Table 1 for additional analyses).  Relationships amongst MS performance and 
the GD conditions were more modest and only significant for the without faces condition 
r(61)=.278, p=.025.  In contrast, Appropriateness scores for the RD were negatively 
correlated with MS scores in the with faces condition r(61)= -.256, p=.028), and not were not 
significantly related to the without faces condition r(61)= .027, p= .265.  These findings 
suggested that children’s increasing aptitude in recognizing emotions may make them more 
likely to attribute higher levels of intentionality to Animations scenes, but these attributions 
are not always accurate, and findings on the RD condition suggest that children may actually 
be overattributing intentions as they increase in age.  Moreover, different patterns of results 
emerged between the with faces and without faces conditions, indicating that these two 
conditions may have different levels of sensitivity to emerging emotion recognition skills.
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Examination of all three conditions is therefore important for understanding children’s level 
of intentionality detection and the accuracy with which it is applied.  
Together, these results indicate that developments in faux pas detection parallel 
developments in emotion recognition from both faces and other gestures.  The FP task also 
seems to measure developments that parallel advances detected by the Animations task, 
namely those related to accurately understanding the intentions of objects in the ToM scenes.  
The relationship between FP scores and Animations scores was not significant for any other 
condition or score type, indicating that these tasks may be tapping unique constructs, and that 
only the most complex Animations scenes may be measuring skills that overlap with 
children’s ability to detect faux pas.  However, performance on the Animations task was 
highly correlated with both conditions of the MS task.  Different patterns of association 
emerged between different conditions for both tasks, suggesting that each of these conditions 
may be useful for understanding different aspects of children’s social cognitive development.  
Sensitivity of Individual Measures
Following these analyses, we examined the sensitivity of each individual measure to 
children’s developing social cognitive skills.  We regressed children’s VMA, gender, and 
chronological age on each of the dependent measures (i.e., scores from the primary 
measures).  Subject characteristics are listed in Table 2.  For each model, VMA was used as 
an indicator of children’s verbal ability.  This score was derived from children’s performance 
on the PPVT-R and was chosen due to the restricted range of standardized scores.  
Three subjects were identified as outliers based upon their VMA.  Because of the 
evenness of the upper end of the distribution of VMA, small increases in raw scores above 
300 resulted in large changes in VMA.  As a result, three subjects had VMAs more than 2 
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standard deviations from the mean.  Therefore, these subjects were not included in final 
analyses.
All predictor variables were centered prior to analyses in order to reduce the effects of 
multicollinearity.  In addition, assumptions of normality and homoscedacticity were met for 
each independent variable.  Dummy codes for gender (females=0, males=1) were used in all 
analyses.  Chronological age and VMA were converted into total months and, therefore, 
treated as continuous variables.  This procedure allowed for more statistical power and 
eliminated the possible confounds of selecting arbitrary cutoff points for separate age groups.  
Alpha was set at p<.05 for all analyses.
Faux Pas Task
We first examined individual results computed by adding children’s scores for 
identifying the faux pas (i.e., question #2 for each item) and false beliefs questions (i.e.,
question #4 for each item) across all items.  Therefore, children’s scores ranged from 0 to 2 
for each item, and the total range was 0-20 for the FP task.  A hierarchical linear regression 
was conducted, using VMA, gender, chronological age, and an age by gender interaction 
term, respectively.  Comprehension questions were not included in the total scores but were 
examined in order to eliminate cases in which children were unable to identify a faux pas 
because they did not understand or attend to a given story.  If children did not correctly 
answer the comprehension question but did get the remaining questions correct, his or her 
score was still used in final analyses.  This case-wise deletion process eliminated four items 
from a total of three subjects.      
Results of examining VMA, gender, chronological age and the interaction term as 
predictors of FP score  were not significant F(3, 58)=2.335, p=.067, but VMA was 
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significantly correlated with total items correct r (59)=.258, p=.045.  These results suggested 
that this measure was not sensitive to theory of mind differences above and beyond 
developments in verbal ability.    
Item Analysis
A second purpose in investigating the FP task was to examine why children who 
correctly identified some faux pas were not able to label each remaining faux pas.  To study 
this, we examined whether any of the 10 faux pas items were answered correctly either more 
or less often than other items.  In fact, we found that there was a large range between items in 
the proportion of children who responded correctly (.35-.93) (Table 3).  These results 
indicated that items likely differed in some important way(s).   
We thus correlated the proportion of children who responded correctly to each item 
with several variables.  These variables included the following: 1) number of words, 2) 
number of sentences, 3) number of characters in the story, 4) number of verbal exchanges, 5) 
placement of the faux pas within the story, 6) whether or not one of the characters responded 
to or redirected attention away from the faux pas, and 7) whether or not the faux pas 
contained some negative connotation, as if intended to offend someone (e.g., “those curtains 
are horrible,” “would you like to hear my joke about sick people?”).  The only significant 
relationship found was that between the proportion of children responding correctly to an 
item and whether or not that item contained a negative connotation.  Analyses suggested that 
items with a negative connotation were answered correctly more often than those without a 
negative connotation (t (10)= -2.785, p=.014).  Items with a negative connotation were 
characterized by their inclusion of a statement that might be construed as inappropriate 
regardless of what is known about the characters’ mental state(s) (i.e., “That new boy looks 
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weird”).  Children could have used the negative connotation to surmise that something was 
said that “should not have been said” without their knowing precisely that the affect of the 
statement was that someone’s feelings were hurt.  Moreover, one item in which a character 
committed a faux pas by expressing empathy towards another character (i.e., “I’m sorry that 
your story did not win”) without knowing that the character had not yet heard the bad news 
was answered significantly less often than any of the remaining items 2(1, N = 10)=9.284, 
p<.0025.  This finding suggested that the manner in which the faux pas was committed may 
have impacted whether or not children perceived it as an inappropriate statement.  These 
results indicated that the connotations of the statements themselves, as opposed to their social 
context, may modulate whether or not children identify faux pas as inappropriate.
Finally, we analyzed whether older children performed better or equal to younger 
children according to the level of difficulty of the items.  In order to investigate this 
relationship, we compared the oldest (> 11 years) and youngest (< 7 years) children on both 
easy (i.e., those with a negative phrase or word) and difficult (i.e., those remaining) items.  
Results indicated that older children performed significantly better than younger children on 
items with a negative connotation t (22)= 2.256, p=.038 but not on other items t (22)=1.214, 
p=.238.  These findings indicated that older children were better able than younger children 
to identify faux pas only when the faux pas contained a negative connotation.  
Movie Stills Task
Next we examined the sensitivity of the MS task to developments in emotion 
recognition skill.  Children’s scores for both the “with faces” and “without faces” conditions 
were analyzed as a parametric function of the distribution of scores reported by healthy 
adults.  The test developers (Adolphs & Tranel) previously collected these results and aided 
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in the computation of children’s scores.  A paired-samples t-test was computed to compare 
mean performance across emotions for the two conditions.  As expected, results indicated 
that subjects more accurately identified emotions in pictures with faces than those without 
faces t(63)=9.374, p<.001.  
Based upon these findings, we analyzed the two conditions separately.  Hierarchical 
multiple regressions were conducted.  VMA, gender, and chronological age were entered as 
independent predictors for each condition.  MS scores were the dependent variables.  Results 
suggested that the overall model was a highly significant predictor of performance on the MS 
task when faces were erased F(3, 61)=5.987, p<.001, and that chronological age t
(61)=2.615, p=.011 accounted for a significant proportion of the variance above and beyond 
the variance accounted for by VMA and gender.  Neither VMA t (61) = .833, p=.409 nor 
gender t(61) = -1.609, p=.113 were significant predictors.  However, because previous 
findings had indicated that females outperform males on emotion recognition tasks during 
latency years, we performed a Mann-Whitney U test to account for uneven sample sizes of 
males and females and found that females showed superior performance to males (U=297, 
p=.030).
The overall model also was significant for performance on the MS with faces 
condition F(3, 61)=5.291, p=.001.  Post-hoc analyses indicated that the effect of gender was 
significant after covarying VMA t(61)=-2.331, p=.023, suggesting that females performed 
better than males.  Also, the effect of chronological age was significant after covarying VMA 
and gender t(61)=2.626, p=.011, suggesting that older children performed better than 
younger children.
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Finally, a difference score was calculated to examine the level to which the presence 
of facial cues improved children’s performance.  The overall model was not significant for 
the difference score between conditions F(3,61)=.255, p=.950.  
Item analysis
Because studies previously have shown that children’s skill in recognizing emotions 
differs across emotions, we investigated each emotion separately.  The present task contained 
two “happy,” five “afraid,” four “angry,” three “sad,” one “surprised,” and one “neutral” 
scene for each condition.  Mean scores for each of these emotions are listed in Table 4.    
Results revealed a differential pattern between basic (i.e., happy, sad) and more 
complex emotions (i.e., surprised, angry, afraid).  First, the overall hierarchical model testing 
VMA, gender, chronological age and a chronological age x gender interaction was a 
significant predictor when faces were erased for happy scenes F(3,61)=3.071, p=.035 and 
approached significance for sad scenes F(3,61)=3.140, p=.051.  Investigation of both models 
indicated that chronological age was a significant predictor for happy scenes t(61)=2.798, 
p=.007, but not for sad scenes t(61)=1.577, p=.120.  The model was not a significant 
predictor for any of the complex emotions or for neutral scenes.  These findings suggested 
that the MS task only is sensitive to developments in identifying happy and sad faces, or that 
children do not show significant developments in identifying complex emotions or neutral 
expressions within complex scenes during this age period.  
Second, results for scenes with faces revealed that the model was significant only for 
sad scenes F(3,61)=3.989, p=.012.  Further analyses indicated that this significance was 
driven by the effect of gender t(61)=-2.189, p=.033, with females outperforming males.  In 
contrast, chronological age was a significant predictor of performance on sad scenes only 
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when an interaction term is not considered t(61)=2.440, p=.018.  These results suggested that 
low power (kappa=.105) could have had an impact on our ability to detect significance when 
an interaction term was added to the equation.  Further, low power also could have biased 
results as there were relatively few pictures in each emotion category.  However, the model 
was not significant for the two emotions that appeared most frequently (i.e., afraid, angry) in 
either condition.
Animations Task
Last, we examined the sensitivity of the Animations task.  This measure was 
hypothesized to be the most complex for children because it presented children with dynamic 
interactions in which they were forced to track the mental states of the moving shapes.  
Additionally, children’s performance scores were based both on their ability to infer mental 
states and on their ability to recognize emotions and detect the intentions underlying the 
action.
We first compared children’s performance across conditions (see Table 5).  Analyses 
revealed that conditions differed in terms of intentionality, appropriateness, and length.  Each 
difference was in the expected direction.  
Because children’s responses differed significantly for each condition, we analyzed 
ToM, GD, and RD responses separately.  As in previous analyses, VMA, gender, and 
chronological age comprised the independent predictors along with an age x gender 
interaction term in a hierarchical equation.  Results suggested that the model was significant 
for intentionality scores for the RD conditions F(3, 59)=3.685, p=.010.  Post-hoc analyses 
indicated that there was a significant interaction of gender and chronological age t(59)=-
2.747, p=.008 in which age was not a significant predictor for females, but was significant 
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for males (Figure 1).  Older males ascribed less intentionality than younger males to RD 
vignettes, though there was no difference between older and younger females.    
Finally, the model was significant for intentionality in the ToM condition 
F(3,60)=3.866, p=.008.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that age accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance in intentionality after covarying VMA and gender t(60)=2.251, 
p=.028.  These results indicated that older children consistently ascribed greater 
intentionality than younger children to ToM vignettes.  In contrast, the model was not 
significant for intentionality in the GD condition F(3,60)=1.312, p=.277.
We then analyzed the accuracy of children’s descriptions.  The model was not 
significant for appropriateness on the RD F(3,64)=.588, p=.673 or GD conditions F(3,64)= 
2.168, p=.084.  In contrast, the model was significant for the ToM condition F(3,64)=7.970, 
p<.001.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that the effect of chronological age was significant above 
and beyond the influence of VMA and gender t(64)=2.332, p=.023, and that the effect of 
gender approached significance t(64)= -1.749, p=.086.  For length, the model was not 
significant for the RD F(3,64)=.760, p=.555, GD F(3,64)=.092, p=.985, or ToM conditions 
F(3,64)=.456, p=.768.  
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Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to examine three advanced social cognition 
measures and their sensitivity to the important social cognitive developments that occur 
during latency years.  Further, we wished to investigate the specificity of these tasks by 
examining their relationship with one another.  Finally, we sought to examine variables that 
potentially modulated children’s performance on these measures.   
Relationship Between Social Cognition Tasks
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our results suggested that all three social cognitive 
measures used in the present study are sensitive to subtle developmental changes within the 
latency years and that aspects of cognitive development tapped by each of the measures are 
correlated with each other.  The correlations between the three social cognitive measures 
used in the present study suggest that these measures are sensitive to a variety of related 
social cognitive skills that may reflect a similar latent construct.  Earlier research had 
suggested that theory of mind and emotion recognition functions are integrated in typically 
developing children (Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997).  Consistent with this, our analyses 
revealed that typically-developing children’s ability to recognize faux pas was highly 
correlated with their skill in recognizing emotions from complex social scenes.  Children’s 
ability to identify faux pas also was related to their skill at appropriately recognizing the 
intentions and mental states of moving figures, but only when scenes were complex and 
conveyed the intention of one character attempting to affect the mental state of another
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character (ToM condition).  In contrast, FP task performance was not related to the 
level of intentionality ascribed to moving shapes or the accuracy with which it was applied 
when interactions conveyed “less intentional” behavior.  These conditions thus may not be 
sensitive to social cognitive functions necessary for identifying faux pas.  
Children’s performance on each of the Animations conditions was more strongly 
associated with their performance on the MS task, though the pattern of significant 
correlations differed by score type and condition.  For instance, the level of intentionality 
characterizing children’s responses for each condition of the Animations task were positively 
correlated with their performance on both conditions of the MS task.  However, the 
appropriateness of children’s responses for the RD condition of the Animations task were
negatively correlated with their performance on the MS task.  Moreover, this negative 
correlation only emerged with the with faces condition of the MS task.  These results likely 
reflect children’s tendency to overattribute intentions based on expectations.  Children with 
greater emotion recognition skill may comprehend a greater array of possible intentions, but 
they may overgeneralize this knowledge in naturalistic interactions.  These findings have not 
yet been explored in adults, but may parallel research indicating that adults do respond to 
prompts that behavior is intentional, despite an absence of evidence that an action truly is 
goal-directed (Heider & Simmel, 1944).  Also, the two conditions of the MS task may be 
tapping into separable, though highly correlated skills.  The finding that RD appropriateness 
scores were inversely correlated with scores from the with faces condition but not with scores 
from the without faces condition may indicate that the former condition is more 
encompassing, and thus able to detect a greater range of developments, some of which are 
related to children’s tendency to overattribute intentions.  
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The Animations task was incorporated into this study because it appeared to provide a 
more naturalistic measure of children’s inference making and emotion recognition abilities.  
Our analyses indicate that children’s emotion recognition skill is related to their performance 
on the Animations task.  In contrast, children’s performance on the FP task was not related to 
their ability to infer intentions on the Animations task.  This finding is striking because both 
of these measures purport to study the development of mental state inferences, or theory of 
mind processing.  The finding that FP task performance is not significantly related to 
Animations task intentionality detection indicates that the former task may not be 
generalizable to more naturalistic social interactions.  Instead, the FP task may be assessing 
other cognitive skills, such as verbal ability, reasoning skill, and the ability to identify social 
rules.  However, these cognitive processes do not necessitate a theory of mind.  Research 
investigating the relationship between FP Task performance and other cognitive skills as well 
as everyday social functioning would be helpful for elucidating the validity of this measure.
Faux Pas Task
Findings from the present investigation did not support the first part of Hypothesis 2 
and instead suggested that children’s chronological age was not a significant predictor of 
their performance on the FP task.  These results differed from those reported by the original 
test developers (Baron-Cohen, O’riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999).  Several 
explanations could be offered for this difference.  First, our findings supported the second 
portion of Hypothesis 2 and did suggest that children’s performance on the FP task was 
significantly related to their VMA.  Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) also reported that FP task 
performance was related to VMA in their typically developing sample, but the authors did 
not account for this relationship in their final analyses.  Rather, to address issues regarding 
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the role of verbal ability in completing the FP task, Baron-Cohen and colleagues included 
children only if they were able to pass 7 out of 10 comprehension questions.  The authors did 
not report how many children this criteria excluded, but in the present investigation, we did 
not find any children who failed more than one comprehension question.  Thus, the 
comprehension questions may have been too basic to measure children’s verbal 
understanding of more subtle or sophisticated nuances within the items.  
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1999) also suggested that a significant relationship 
between verbal ability and faux pas performance is expected because both cognitive 
operations develop throughout childhood.  The authors concluded that FP task performance 
should be correlated with “any other ability that increases with age” (p.411).  In contrast, the 
authors reported that FP task performance was not related to nonverbal IQ, and our results 
suggested that faux pas performance was not significantly correlated with children’s ability 
to detect intentions of goal-directed objects, which we did find to be a cognitive skill that 
develops during childhood.  The previous authors may not have adequately accounted for the 
verbal demands of identifying faux pas within the story, while our analyses addressed this 
limitation and suggested that verbal ability may account for a significant proportion of the 
developmental differences in faux pas performance.
An additional reason that our results may have differed from Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999) is that we characterized chronological age as a continuous variable, whereas the test 
developers compared three discrete age groups (i.e., 7- vs. 9- vs. 11-year-olds) and defined 
age as a categorical variable.  We chose to characterize age as a continuous variable to 
eliminate any arbitrary cutoff points, as children develop at different rates.  However, it is 
possible that by only including participants in disparate age groups, Baron-Cohen and 
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colleagues were better able to detect significant differences between participants further apart 
in age.  This seems unlikely because our analyses revealed that children in the upper and 
lower end of our age range did not differ significantly in FP task performance when VMA 
was considered as a covariate.  
Movie Stills Task
The present study is the first known research to investigate the sensitivity of the 
Movie Stills (MS) Task to emotion recognition developments in children.  This task is an 
advancement over previous emotion recognition measures for two reasons: 1) children are 
shown complex social scenes that are more similar to naturalistic social events, and 2) 
children view two conditions differentiated only by the absence or presence of faces, 
allowing researchers to cleanly isolate the role of facial displays in children’s emotion 
detection skill.  
Findings from the present investigation confirmed Hypothesis 3 and suggested that 
the MS Task is sensitive to children’s developing ability to recognize emotions from both 
facial and non-facial cues. Children’s performance when faces were included improved with 
age, as did their performance on scenes without faces.  A difference score computed by 
subtracting performance on the without faces from performance on the with faces condition 
was not significantly related to chronological age.  These results indicated that this measure 
did not detect any age-related changes in facial emotion recognition skill in typically 
developing latency aged children.  
Older children did perform better than younger children on scenes without faces, 
indicating that children become better able to integrate a variety of non-facial social cues into 
their percepts.  These findings remained significant after partialing out the effects of verbal 
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ability.  The above results are consistent with studies indicating that the recognition of 
nonverbal emotional expressions undergoes a major development during the latency years 
(McCluskey & Albas, 1981; Philippot & Feldman, 1990).  Findings from the present 
investigation suggested that females performed better than males on both scenes with and 
scenes without faces.  These results are consistent with previous reports documenting 
improved facial affect recognition in females (for a review, see McClure, 2000), but our 
finding that females outperform males when faces were erased suggests that gender 
differences in emotion recognition skill at this age may be due to females’ superiority in 
interpreting a multitude of facial and non-facial social cues .  
Animations Task
Analyses of the Animations task supported our predictions in Hypothesis 4 and 
revealed that this measure was sensitive to developments in the ability to infer the intentions 
of goal-directed objects.  Unlike previous investigations applying this task to children (i.e., 
Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000; Montgomery & Montgomery, 1999), our study highlighted this 
task’s ability to measure the development of intentionality detection in a large group of 
children who already had passed the age at which most children understand that others have 
separate mental states.  We also found that age was a significant predictor of performance 
after accounting for the effects of verbal developments.  This measure thus offers a useful 
tool for examining social cognition and theory of mind developments with more naturalistic 
stimuli.  Children viewed dynamic interactions which, while being impoverished, still 
provided multiple dynamic social cues to convey intentions, emotions, and mental states.  
This task thus may be more representative of naturalistic social functioning and development 
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than static laboratory measures which do not provide children with multiple, visual social 
cues, or demand that they track ongoing behavioral exchanges.  
A goal of the present study was to investigate whether the three Animations 
conditions were sensitive to developmental changes in the degree to which participants 
ascribed intentionality to the moving shapes and the accuracy with which they described the 
interactions between the shapes.  First, findings indicated that children’s age predicted the 
level of intentionality observed within the ToM vignettes but not within the other two 
conditions.  These results suggested that older children’s descriptions of observed 
interactions did not contain more social descriptors than younger children’s for the two 
conditions that either were not intended to portray social interaction (RD) or depicted more 
simple interaction (GD).  However, in the ToM condition, older children appeared better able 
to understand other’s mental states and subtle changes in their mental states than were 
younger children.  An example of this difference in complexity was seen in two similar 
vignettes.  Age did not predict level of intentionality within children’s descriptions for a 
scenario in which two triangles played follow-the-leader.  In contrast, when the triangles 
engaged in largely the same movements, but the scenario also depicted some “mocking” 
behavior performed by the triangle that was following, older children were better able to 
understand the intent of the mocking triangle and the effects of this behavior on the leading 
triangle.  Therefore, only the ToM condition appeared to be challenging enough to reveal 
developmental changes.
One interesting finding did emerge regarding the RD animations.  Analyses revealed 
a significant gender x age interaction for intentionality, suggesting that younger males 
ascribed greater intentionality to the RD condition than older males.  There was no 
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significant effect for females.  These findings indicated that younger males in our sample 
may not yet be able to distinguish intentional from unintentional behaviors.  Findings 
reported by Carpendale and Chandler (1996) suggested that males develop an understanding 
of the intentions underlying social behaviors at a later age than do females.  Our results 
supported Carpendale and Chandler’s work.  Younger, latency-aged males may not apply 
their knowledge of intentionality with the same level of specificity that older latency-aged 
males do.
Findings also indicated that children’s age predicted the accuracy with which they 
described the vignettes.  Older children in our sample were better able to accurately narrate 
the action in ToM and GD vignettes than younger children.  Moreover, the superior 
performance of older children existed above and beyond their verbal skill.  Age effects likely 
were not present in the RD condition given the relative simplicity of these vignettes and 
ceiling effects.  In the ToM and GD conditions, older children were better able to integrate 
action from throughout the scenario in order to describe the central purpose of the vignette.  
Younger children tended to either miss the central point or become overly focused on a 
minor aspect of the story.  Older children appeared to have developed a better “central 
coherence” or ability to organize critical aspects into a meaningful whole.  Measures that do 
not provide such complexity of dynamic action may not be sensitive to this developmental 
change.  Moreover, this superior performance existed above and beyond children’s verbal 
skill.  
Individual item a nalyses
Faux Pas Task
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To address Hypothesis 5, we examined individual items of the FP Task.  While 
results suggested that overall, the FP task is not sensitive to age differences in identifying 
faux pas, our investigation of individual task items did reveal an important finding.  If the 
item contained a negatively valenced statement (e.g, “he looks weird”) or word (e.g., 
“horrible”), both older and younger children were significantly better at identifying faux pas 
than they were on items that did not include a negative statement or word.  Additionally, 
older children performed significantly better than younger children at identifying faux pas in 
items with a negative valence, but not in items without.  
These results suggested that the FP task is sensitive to children’s developing capacity 
to detect socially inappropriate, or potentially offensive statements, rather than faux pas, per 
se.  The overt nature of the inappropriate statement appears to moderate children’s skill in 
deciphering whether or not an individual has committed a social blunder.  These negative 
words or phrases may cue children that something has been said that should not have been 
said.  However, such cues appear to decrease the demands on children’s theory of mind as 
they mark the inappropriate statement without children having to track the mental contents of 
each character.
Another explanation for why children may have performed better on items with a 
negative valence is related to the nature of the task instructions.  The present study adhered to 
the guidelines reported by the test developers who suggested that the most child-friendly way 
of querying subjects’ understanding of faux pas is to ask, “Did any of the characters say 
something that they should not have said?” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).  This phrasing could 
pull for faux pas as well as statements that may be intentionally offensive.  In other words, 
children may decide that an individual “should not have said” something for a variety of 
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reasons, including because it was unintentionally hurtful, because it was malicious, or 
because it violates a social rule.  In contrast to other social blunders, faux pas are defined by 
the test authors as “when a speaker says something without considering if it is something that 
the listener might not want to hear or know, and which typically has negative consequences 
that the speaker never intended” (Baron-Cohen, O’riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999, p. 
408).  Inherent in identifying faux pas then is having a theory of mind, or an understanding of 
what the speaker intends to convey and what the listener “might not want to hear or know.”  
Findings from the present investigation suggested that as children age, they may not improve 
in their ability to track mental states; rather they may become more adept at attending to 
negative statements.  Because age also was a predictor of children’s skill in identifying the 
intention of speakers committing a faux pas, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the manner 
in which faux pas were probed may have driven our findings that items with a negative 
valence were more identifiable for children.
Movie Stills Task
For Hypothesis 6, we examined recognition of each individual emotion within the MS 
task.  Results from the present investigation indicating that latency-aged children show more 
improvement in their ability to identify happy and sad emotions in comparison to other 
emotions is surprising given the research findings that recognition of happy and sad emotions 
develops rapidly during early childhood.  Researchers have suggested that happy and sad are 
the first emotions that infants are able to recognize.  The present findings suggest that despite 
children’s ability to recognize these emotions early in ontogeny, children in middle 
childhood still appear to improve in their overall recognition of happy and sad displays 
embedded within complex social scenes.  
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We found it surprising that age was not a significant predictor of children’s ability to 
identify the other emotions used in the MS task in either the with or without faces 
conditions..  Perhaps, affective displays indicating anger, fear, or surprise are more 
contingent upon an event or interaction and thus require a greater understanding of context 
than a static picture can convey.  It also could be the case that children could not identify 
more complex emotions because the scenes were too ambiguous.  Indeed, the emotions in 
many scenes were not agreed upon by all the healthy adults in the test developers’ original 
sample.  Thus, subtle differences between separate but similar emotions (e.g., fear and anger) 
may not be detectable in naturalistic scenes without the benefit of some contextual 
information.  Future research may address this issue by testing the minimal amounts of 
information necessary to convey specific emotions with greater clarity.
Summary
Together these findings highlight the importance of studying individual social 
cognition measures and their sensitivity to a range of cognitive developments.  Two of the 
tasks studied here (i.e., Movie Stills Task and Animations) were shown to be sensitive to 
social cognitive developments in latency-aged children, but the FP task was found to be more 
highly associated with children’s developing verbal ability.  The finding that chronological 
age was predictive of performance on the MS and Animations tasks above and beyond verbal 
ability indicates that they are sensitive to the social cognitive function that they intend to 
measure.  In contrast, findings regarding the FP task suggest that developmental differences 
may be more related to children’s developing verbal skill than their developing theory of 
mind.  Moreover, the individual items within this task appeared to differ in terms of their 
difficulty, and their level of difficulty was moderated by whether or not they contained a cue 
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that could be identified as inappropriate regardless of whether it was a faux pas.  Future 
research applying the FP task should consider each of these variables when interpreting 
results.
More broadly, the findings reported here suggest that measuring social cognitive 
development during the latency years must always consider developments in other cognitive 
functions, differential patterns of development between genders, the complexity of the social 
information that is presented, and potential differences between individual items.  
Additionally, important social cognitive developments emerge in this age period that may be 
associated with one another or may be somewhat independent.  It will be useful to 
disentangle the associations between separate cognitive functions so that interpretations may 
become more precise and meaningful.  It also will be important to continue to examine the 
validity and sensitivity of social cognition measures prior to their being applied in 
comparison studies with atypical populations.  Such reports may be further obscuring the 
social cognitive differences seen in these abnormal populations by misinterpreting the 
essence of what these tasks are measuring.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations of this study should be addressed in future research.  First, this 
study investigated laboratory tasks of social cognitive functioning that may or may not 
correspond directly with social functioning or theory of mind processing in naturalistic 
situations.  We attempted to use three tasks that are more naturalistic than traditional 
measures.  However, each of these tasks eliminates several variables and demands present in 
real-life social situations.  For instance, our laboratory tasks offered explicit instructions for 
children to attend to the stimuli.  This direction is not offered in real-life social interactions, 
48
and thus children may attend to different aspects of the interaction.  Also, tasks were not 
timed and may have allowed children to develop alternative strategies for solving these 
problems (Bowler, 1992).  Real-life social interactions provide changing information and 
response demands within an appropriate time-frame.  Thus, future investigations may shed 
light on the relationship between performance on laboratory tasks assessing social cognitive 
development and more naturalistic applications.  
Second, this study included a relatively small, homogenous sample of children.  Most 
children in our study were Caucasian, the children of university professors, and from middle 
to upper-middle class families.  As a result, our sample may not be representative of the 
larger population.  
Additionally, our sample size may limit our interpretations.  Several findings 
approached significance, and relationships examined for separate age groups were hindered 
by low power.  Also, the greater number of males than females may have made interactions 
difficult to detect.  However, only one significant interaction was detected, and no other 
interactions approached significance.  Moreover, several main effects of gender were 
uncovered in final analyses.
Finally, our use of a receptive vocabulary test to approximate verbal ability may have 
limited our capacity to account for a greater breadth of verbal functions.  While our results 
suggested that we were able to capture important and related verbal developments, a broader 
battery of verbal tests may be useful for disentangling these skills from those necessary for 
sociocognitive performance.  Also, other related cognitive processes (e.g., nonverbal IQ, 
executive functions) will be important to consider in future investigations.  Research has 
more strongly implicated the role of verbal ability in performance on social cognitive 
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measures, but theoretical and some empirical reports also have highlighted a role for these 
other cognitive domains in social cognitive performance.  Although such investigations may 
warrant longer test batteries, they may begin to tease apart developments and relationships 
within these different domains.
Conclusion
Overall, our study highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of three advanced 
social cognitive measures.  Results provided evidence for the sensitivity of two of these 
measures to the developments in social cognitive functioning emerging during latency years.  
In contrast, the FP task does not appear to be as sensitive to these social developments, and 
children’s performance appears to be modulated by their verbal ability and the difficulty of 
items as defined by whether or not they conveyed a negative connotation.  Additional 
variables, including gender, complexity, and the type of emotion/interaction presented further 
modulated performance on all measures.  These variables should be considered in the 
development of future social cognitive measures as well as in interpretations drawn from 
current tasks.  Our study also highlighted that skills across different domains of social 
cognitive processing appear to be highly related to each other in typically developing 
children.  Examination of the relationship between these abilities may shed light on 
underlying impairments mediating social skill deficits in disorders, such as autism, that have 
been hypothesized to be “disconnect” syndromes in which children are not able to integrate 
multiple social cues into their percepts.  
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Appendix A
Animations Task Scoring Guidelines
Scoring verbal descriptions: The verbal descriptions given after each animation 
were transcribed verbatim and coded in terms of three different dimensions:
Intentionality Score (0 to 5). The Intentionality score reflects the use of mental state 
terms.  The degree of attribution of mental states to the triangles (agents) of the animations is 
calculated by analysing the content of each description given by the subjects.  In the effort to 
control as much as possible the use of subjective methods in interpreting someone else’s 
language, terminology, idioms and so forth, the analysis is conducted exclusively on the type 
of verb contained in each sentence used to describe the triangles’ actions.  
The degree of intentionality reflects in each action is measured with a numerical scale 
from zero to five.  The scale was created explicitly for this task and the type of stimuli that 
subjects had to describe somehow influenced it.  Thus, it is clear that a measure applied to 
verbal descriptions concerning two agents interacting along a complex motion pattern, cannot 
and should not reflect the complexity of mental states appreciation contained in any language 
describing any social context.
In developing the score, the “intentionality ladder” came into shape, with an agent 
moving upwards, appreciating step by step both actions, and mental states of another agent.  
At the bottom of the ladder, where there is no appreciation of another agent, nor actions or 
mental states (score=0), the agent acts with no intention, and no interaction, randomly, e.g. 
“moving around”, or “floating”.  A further step up in the ladder (score=1), the agent acts 
with a purpose, a goal, with no interaction with another agent, e.g. “walking”, or 
“swimming”.  The following step up (score=2), is when the agent acts with a purpose with 
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another agent, e.g. “fighting” or “following”: the actions of the two agents are parallel in 
time.  A further step up (score=3) is when the agent not only interacts with another agent but 
acts in response to the other’s action, e.g. “chasing”, or “restraining”: the actions of the two 
agents are sequential in time.  Finally, the two steps at the top of the ladder concern the 
agent’s appreciation of mental states.  The lower step (score=4) is when the agent acts in 
response to a mental state, e.g. “arguing”, “wanting” or “encouraging”.  The upper step 
(score=5) is when the agent acts with the goal of affecting or manipulating the other agent’s 
mental states, e.g. “pretending”, “deceiving” or “coaxing”.  
Appropriateness score (0-3)
The Appropriateness score measured the understanding of the event depicted in the 
animations, as intended by the designers.  The score, ranging from zero to three, was based 
on the underlying script for each animation.  Details of criteria for rating the appropriateness 
of each animation are given in Appendix 4D.  The degree of appropriate description of the 
animation was calculated by analysing the agents’ actions and interactions.  For example, an 
appropriate description (score=3) for the animation where the big triangle persuades the little 
one to go out, need to convey the idea of little triangle’s reluctance to go out and big 
triangle’s attempts to get the little one out, e.g. “persuading” or “coaxing”.  A less 
appropriate description (score=2) would focus on one aspect of the story or one character 
only. e.g. little one doesn't want to go out; or, big one is pushing little one to go out.  An 
inappropriate description (score=1) concerns actions that do not relate to the events or relate 
to a very minor aspect of the sequence only, e.g. “the two triangles didn’t like each other”.  
Finally, when the subject did not provide any description, the score was zero.
Length Score 
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Scores reflected the number of clauses within subjects’ descriptions.  Clauses were 
defined as a subject and a predicate.
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Table 1: Relationship of Social Cognition Measures
Measures
FP Task MS
Task
(W/
faces)
MS
Task
(W/O
faces)
Animati
ons 
ToM 
(intent.) 
Animati
ons 
ToM 
(approp.
)
Animati
ons GD 
(intent.)
Animati
ons GD 
(approp.
)
Animati
ons RD
(intent.) 
Animati
ons RD 
(approp.
)
FP Task *
MS Task
(With 
faces)
.396** *
MS Task
(W/o
faces)
.285* .570*** *
Animatio
ns ToM 
(intent.) 
.227 .364** .391** *
Animatio
ns ToM 
(approp.)
.382** .358** .425** .757*** *
Animatio
ns GD 
(intent.)
.077 .345** .412** .434** .304* *
Animatio
ns GD 
(approp.)
-.023 .177 .278* .191 .153 .465*** *
Animatio
ns RD 
(intent.)
-.030 .377** .147 .313* .162 .338 .124 *
Animatio
ns RD 
(approp.)
.101 -.256* .027 -.317* -.126 -.205 .025 -
.818***
*
*p<.05
**=p<.01
***=p<.001
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Table 2: Subject Characteristics
N Mean age
(months)
sd Age range Mean 
VMA
(months)
VMA sd VMA 
range
Females 24 111.67 20.58 73-143 153.67 38.50 93-222
Males 37 110.89 17.99 74-148 140.70 27.32 96-211
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Table 3: Ranking of Faux Pas Items by Proportion of Children Responding Correctly
Item Rank Proportion Correct
1 .37
2 .50
3 .57
4 .58
5 .62
6 .68
7* .78
8* .80
9* .83
10* .93
* indicates items contained negatively valenced word or phrase
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Table 4: Mean Score on Movie Stills Task by Emotion
EmotionCondition
happy sad afraid angry surprised neutral
With Faces .99 .55 .59 .49 .50 .36
Without Faces .71 .46 .45 .46 .39 .31
62
Table 5. Animations Scores
ConditionScore Type
ToM 
mean
ToM 
sd
GD 
mean
GD 
sd
RD 
mean
RD 
sd F p
Intentionality 3.51 1.05 2.26 .43 .67 .72 26.46 <.001
Appropriateness .84 .38 1.40 .41 1.43 .56 17.65 <.001
Length 4.62 2.35 3.06 1.91 2.42 1.18 15.59 <.001
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean SD Min. Max.
Age 61 111.5 18.7 73 148
VMA 61 145.8 32.51 93 145.8
FP total 60 34.02 3.43 22 40
MS (w/o faces) 61 .48 .10 .20 .76
MS (w/faces) 61 .59 .10 .31 .85
MS (difference) 61 .11 .10 -.15 .35
RD intentionality 61 .67 .72 .00 3.17
GD intentionality 61 2.26 .43 1.17 3.33
ToM intentionality 60 3.51 1.05 1.33 6.00
RD appropriateness 61 1.43 .56 .00 2.00
GD appropriateness 61 1.40 .41 .00 2.00
ToM appropriateness 60 .84 .38 .00 1.88
RD length 61 2.42 1.18 .33 6.33
GD length 61 3.06 1.91 .00 10.5
ToM length 60 4.62 2.35 .25 12.38
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Table 7. Faux Pas Correlations
Age VMA FP total score
Age *
VMA .648** *
FP total score .296* .302* *
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 8. Movie Stills Correlations
Age VMA MS
(w/o faces)
MS
(w/faces)
MS 
(difference)
Age *
VMA .648** *
MS
(w/o faces)
.483** .427** *
MS
(w/faces)
.432** .345** .570(**) *
MS 
(difference)
-.072 -.103 -.494(**) .433(**) *
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Figure 1. Faux Pas Item Level of Difficulty by Age
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Figure 2. Random Animations Age by Gender Interaction
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